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A B S T R A C T
The drinking water sector is off track to reach Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6.1 with over a quarter of
the world’s population lacking safe and reliable services. Policy approaches are shifting away from provision of
access towards managing the multiple risks of water supply and quality. By considering how infrastructure,
information, and institutional systems evolved in Bangladesh, this article identifies the unintentional con-
sequences of reallocating management responsibility for rural water services away from government agencies
towards individuals and households.
Between 2012 and 2017, we estimate up to forty-five unregulated tubewells were installed privately for every
publicly funded rural waterpoint. This growth rate more than doubled total national waterpoint infrastructure
since 2006. The scale of growth is reflected in the declining ratio of households per tubewell from over fifty-
seven in 1982 to less than two in 2017, potentially approaching market saturation. This scale of growth aligns to
an observed decrease in the real price of private market shallow tubewells by seventy percent between 1982 and
2017. In 2018, we estimate households invested up to USD253 million in tubewells, nearly sixty-five percent of
the total national water and sanitation sector’s household-level finance. In effect, household investments became
critical to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of improved infrastructure access, but now
pose challenges for meeting targets of safely managed services. The scale of continued private investment
provides an opportunity for policymakers to explore blended public finance models to meet emerging consumer
preferences, while at the same time introducing regulatory and monitoring systems.
1. Introduction
The challenges of achieving and sustaining safely managed rural
drinking water for all is being redefined at national and global levels by
expanding the set of standardized targets embedded within Sustainable
Development Goal (SDG) 6.1. Although the day-to-day experience of
water consumers has not changed, the additional indicators widen our
understanding of the global gaps in institutional performance. In 2019
the United Nations Joint Monitoring Programme reported that 785
million people were in need of improved drinking water infrastructure
access compared to over 1.9 billion who required safe and reliable
drinking water services (UNICEF/WHO, 2019). The SDG targets reflect
how global policy drivers are aiming to move beyond a model defined
by provision of goods—specifically improved infrastructure access
targets—to one that also includes managing the multiple risks factors
that undermine safe and reliable services, a key distinction in water
security literature (Bradley and Bartram, 2013). This raises questions of
how to adapt dominant institutional models designed around providing
access to drinking water infrastructure towards ones that manage the
uncertainties, vulnerabilities, and hazards identified across the SDG 6.1
dimensions of water quality, variability of supply, reliability of infra-
structure functionality, and behavioral complexity of decisions and
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investments. In many cases, this requires reflexive confrontation of the
unintended consequences of past decisions and the existing institutional
allocation of risk responsibilities.
Global and national monitoring systems are constantly evolving
enhanced tools and methods to evaluate sector and institutional per-
formance, as well as to identify how risk and exposure is distributed
across geographies and subpopulations (Bartram et al., 2014). How-
ever, these monitoring systems provide limited insights into how in-
stitutions are designed. Knowing who makes decisions and how re-
sponsibility is allocated within institutions is a core component of
understanding risk management. Institutional theorists North (1990)
and Ostrom (2010a) explain that institutions are designed around the
formal and informal rules, norms, and shared strategies that order,
replicate, and thus shape individual and collective decisions. Risk-
management approaches seek to reduce the uncertainties of the deci-
sion-making processes by using information and rules to increase pre-
dictability of the decision outcomes.
The shift in what is measured in SDG 6.1 reinforces the growing
policy and academic debate around the limited capacity of existing
service models to reduce exposure and vulnerability to water safety and
supply reliability risks. Analysis of formal responsibility within existing
water and sanitation service models focuses largely on multi-user sys-
tems, and largely within the context of urban utilities (Bakker, 2013).
This positions many rural and small systems outside regulatory man-
dates and discussions. Recent policy research around the role of private
financial capital in rural contexts suggests that privately managed
systems are increasing in many regions of the world but have only re-
cently been formally recognized within a small number of national
planning frameworks (Butterworth et al., 2013; Lockwood et al., 2017;
Sutton, 2017). This indicates a growing policy gap for managing risks
extending from privately funded and individually managed infra-
structure. These self-supply systems that serve a limited number of
users remain outside existing regulatory systems and are overlooked by
national monitoring systems, specifically in emerging market contexts.
Bangladesh offers a case study reflecting global patterns of how
drinking water responsibility has shifted between public and private
spheres. This article quantifies the extent to which self-supply service
models have increased access to domestic water supplies for millions of
households while also identifying the unintended challenges created by
unregulated decisions and individualization of risk-management re-
sponsibilities. While there is a significant body of literature quantifying
exposure, vulnerability, and hazards related to groundwater quality and
supply in rural Bangladesh (George et al., 2012a; Johnston et al., 2014;
Kabir and Howard, 2007; Smith et al., 2000), we suggest there is a more
limited analysis of how institutions adapt to and manage these risks.
Achieving the SDG targets on water safety, maintenance, affordability,
and equal access will be a challenge under current institutional designs.
The SDG indicators contribute to making these performance gaps
visible.
To explore these gaps, the article reconciles multiple data sets with
new surveys of rural infrastructure systems to contribute a multi-dec-
adal perspective on public and private investment into tubewell and
handpump technology in rural Bangladesh. The analysis applies ma-
chine learning techniques to adjust for uncertainty, adapts mean-
crowding metrics developed by population ecologists to understand
clustering of growth patterns, and draws on spatial analysis to analyze
the rate and scale of growth of tubewell infrastructure across different
regions of Bangladesh. Data from three drinking water infrastructure
audits located in different regions of Bangladesh are compared to
identify the scale of growth and ratio of tubewell installations per
household. One of the study areas is further contrasted with household
socioeconomic surveys. After applying the growth rates to a national
scale model, we discuss the implications of the findings for private fi-
nance of infrastructure, national monitoring systems, and risk-man-
agement approaches.
1.1. Intersection of risk theory and institutional design to achieve SDG 6.1
Rural drinking water service provision models are changing as the
social and political risk logics of institutions evolve. For decades, in-
stitutions in many countries have been designed around positive logics
of acquisition of access to improved drinking water infrastructure.
These institutional mandates are now refocusing more explicitly on
mitigating and managing the distribution of uncertainty, hazards, vul-
nerabilities, and exposure in relation to water quality, supply, relia-
bility, and equitable access. This phenomenon is seen as part of wider
societal shifts of risk logics from ones focused on the distribution of
“goods” such as income, social services, health, and infrastructure into
one increasingly focused on the distribution and prevention of “bads”
by managing uncertainty to reduce hazards, vulnerabilities, and ex-
posure (Beck, 2013, Beck, 1992). This negative logic places attention on
the allocation of responsibility linked to the formal and informal con-
straints on decision-making systems (Beck, 1992; Bergkamp, 2017;
Ewald, 1991; Matten, 2004). The SDGs have reinforced concerns that
many states are unable to ensure safe and reliable drinking water in
rural contexts if the current institutional models remain focused on
positive logics of access.
The differences between these risk logics are immediately under-
stood by the way formal rules, embedded in legal, policy, and admin-
istrative governance structures, respond. This process transforms how
institutions are designed and where the formal and informal rules as-
sign responsibility for making certain decisions (Garrick et al., 2018;
Ostrom, 2010b). Many national governments have retreated from pre-
vious public mandates by ceding responsibility to local municipalities,
private sector providers, and civil society. As the multi-leveled gov-
ernment system struggles to deliver satisfactory services, specifically in
rural contexts, many decisions are shifted to individuals acting outside
formal or collective processes.
These governance transitions in the rural drinking water sector
follow the general process of devolution of institutional responsibility.
Lockwood et al. (2017) categorize these service delivery models into
five groups: community-based; direct local government provisioning;
public utility; private sector; and self-supply. Under all these models,
central government agencies maintain some form of overarching
mandate to ensure provision of drinking water, often financing the
larger infrastructure components. In rural contexts, this is often struc-
tured around unregulated community management models (Harvey
and Reed, 2007). With the wide-scale concerns of underperforming
functionality and reliability of community-managed systems, there is
increasingly a push for professionalized service delivery approaches
(Hope, 2015; Moriarty et al., 2013). In the absence of many of these
systems, and with delivery failures occurring, a fully privatized self-
supply model is emerging in many areas (Sutton, 2017). In the case of
rural settings, these results in the transfer of responsibility and ac-
countability to non-government actors, most often individuals or
groups of households. However, these responsibilities have not been
formalized or reconciled with collective risk-sharing mechanisms or
regulatory guidelines. This sequence facilitates what Koehler et al.
(2018) identify as increasingly pluralist allocations of responsibility, or
ones which simultaneously occur at different institutional levels.
Risk theory provides an analytic framework to interpret how in-
stitutions are shifting responsibility away from states and towards in-
dividuals. Risk-based management approaches help focus on where
decisions are made within polycentric institutions. Attention to deci-
sion-making highlights how both formal and informal rules place con-
straints on individual and collective choices in order to reduce un-
certainty. Beck (1992, p. 35) argues that modern institutions are neither
designed for nor adapting to management of the risk logics that deviate
from provision of goods and services. Institutions are breaking from the
previous linear processes of modernization by monitoring and con-
fronting unintended, harmful, and unpredictable side effects of pre-
vious routine economic, social, and techno-scientific decisions (Lash,
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2003). This self-awareness, or reflexive confrontation of past decisions,
challenges previous risk narratives and perceptions of state capacity to
deliver public goods. Rayner (2007, p. 166) further argues that the rise
of these risk politics has caused the “state to retreat from many re-
sponsibilities and prerogatives that it took for granted in the mid-20th
century, ceding them to the private sector and to civil society in the
form of non-governmental organizations.” This is reflected in the in-
creasingly diffuse institutional power structures that are promoting
decentralization, marketization, and privatization of responsibility
(Bakker, 2002; Beck, 2013; Mythen, 2005).
In response to changing allocations of risk responsibility, rural in-
stitutions are gradually being redesigned, largely informally, away from
collective responsibility structures towards individuals and households.
This is often pronounced in places where the public sector is ceding its
role or has been unable to deliver. This article identifies how and where
these institutional transitions in the rural drinking water sector, as
observed by Rayner (2007) and Bakker (2002), have extended beyond
civil society and private utilities assuming responsibilities where states
have ceded that role, to that of the individual outside any public reg-
ulation or collective shared decisions.
1.2. Uncertainty of the scale of self-supply and private investment
Self-supply, or privately financed and managed systems, often with
limited number of users, are not a new phenomenon in rural areas.
Recent work based on household surveys by Grönwall et al (2010, p.
14) estimate that 269 million urban residents across forty-three coun-
tries rely on self-supply, while country-specific studies in Lebanon
(Korfali and Jurdi, 2007) and Madagascar (MacCarthy et al., 2013)
suggest even greater scales of uncounted private systems. Sector policy
makers have started to formalize self-supply as part of wider sector
strategies in a few countries, including Zambia (Sutton, 2004), the Self-
supply Acceleration Programme in Ethiopia (Butterworth et al., 2013),
the Upgraded Family Well Programme in Zimbabwe (Olschewski,
2016), and widely adopted rain-water harvesting in Thailand (Saladin,
2016). These recent policy initiatives reframe self-supply as an oppor-
tunity to expand access beyond limitations of government public pro-
vision models.
In many countries, including those with advanced regulatory sys-
tems, self-supply also produces unintended challenges. There is no
formal recognition of private water systems and limited regulatory
oversight or enforcement of formal standard for small-scale infra-
structure systems. This includes limited or no oversight of water quality
or water abstraction rates relative to wider supply reliability, specifi-
cally for groundwater. The challenges to managing self-supply are
evident in the United States where an estimated 42.5 million in-
dividuals, or roughly thirteen percent of the total population, rely on
private self-supply from groundwater sources for drinking water (Dieter
et al., 2018). Drinking water systems in the U.S. with fewer than twenty
users are defined as outside federal regulatory mandates, and thus do
not require compliance with national water quality standards (Flanagan
and Zheng, 2018). There is also variation between states in regulating
aquifers with limited monitoring of abstraction rates or supply sus-
tainability.
In other country contexts, particularly Eastern European countries,
the only direct oversight to rural water systems classified as private is
through permitting of drillers and construction standards (Olschewski,
2016). In 2014, the European Union introduced the Drinking Water
Directive, which mandates water quality testing and alignment with
water safety plans to address gaps between urban and small systems,
Fig. 1. Proportion of WASH sector financing sources compared to percent of on-premise drinking water coverage. Data: WHO (2012), WHO (2014), WHO (2017),
and BBS (2015).
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although it does not specify self-supply infrastructure for fewer than
fifty users (Hulsmann and Smeets, 2011). While self-supply is an in-
creasingly prominent policy option in many countries, the lack of reg-
ulatory oversight leaves millions of individuals and households at risk
of being exposed to unsafe water through unlicensed and unmonitored
infrastructure.
These transitions toward self-supply remain largely invisible in na-
tional measurements of institutional performance. The current SDG 6.1
monitoring systems in Bangladesh, as in other countries, are not de-
signed to track private systems or their performance. With households
as the primary unit of analysis, the indicators are not designed to reflect
how risks are managed, but instead to focus on coverage and proxies for
safety including improved infrastructure and distance to dwelling. The
most comprehensive perspective on the distribution of responsibility is
gained through the Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and
Drinking-Water (GLAAS) program run by the World Health
Organization (WHO) in conjunction with participating countries’ sta-
tistical offices. The GLAAS reports offer a globally comparative analysis
of national water and sanitation policies and estimated annual national
sector expenditures (WHO, 2017, 2014, 2012). The results, summarized
for the period from 2010 to 2016 in Fig. 1, show a significant variation
in the share of the total national Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
expenditure provided by households. The disaggregation of sector fi-
nance provided by household, government, and donor funding provides
an indication of the role of the private sector in managing water and
sanitation services, however it remains limited by lack of differentiation
between activities or capital versus operational expenses. This is a
starting point to understanding how responsibilities shift in relation to
financial inputs.
1.3. Evolution of drinking water services and responsibility in Bangladesh
Bangladesh provides a context to consider how rural drinking water
services have transformed and evolved around the changes to public
risk narratives. The country has been frequently portrayed as one of the
most complex social-ecological systems for institutions to negotiate in
order to deliver safe water to the country’s 160 million inhabitants, of
whom 105 million are considered rural (Hoque et al., 2019; World
Bank, 2018a). This portrayal emerges from the confluence of environ-
mental hazards and the unintended consequences of infrastructure
choices (Atkins and Dunn, 2007; Sultana, 2012). Bangladesh’s physical
topography combines with the annual monsoon cycles to create sig-
nificant intra-annual variation of water supply, from flooding events to
declining river levels during the dry season (Rahman and Salehin,
2013). Growing demand for groundwater resources and reduced re-
charge has increased concerns about declining aquifers, particularly
during the dry season (DPHE, 2015a). Driven by the government’s post-
independence promises to provide citizens with functioning infra-
structure and their renewed commitment to global development tar-
gets, drinking water access and safety has been an enduring public
policy challenge in Bangladesh.
The transitions in infrastructure, governance, and risk narratives are
clustered into three periods by Yasmin et al. (2018) for urban context
and Fischer (2019) for the rural setting. The first period, from 1972
until 1992, reflects the focus on reducing exposure to cholera, diarrhea
and fecal contamination through a shift of household water sources
from ponds and other surface water to groundwater abstraction through
tubewells. Between 1972 and 1985, the government and international
development partners installed an estimated 408,000 public shallow
tubewells and 15,000 public deep tubewells (Black, 1990). The design
and manufacturing of cast-iron handpumps reduced the production
costs while also improving their durability. The growth of domestic
production capability paired with the release of government control
over supply chains enabled the growth of local markets, many of which
were initially financed by demand from the irrigation sector (Black,
1990; Frink and Fannon, 1974). These technological advances and
domestic supply chains put in place the enabling conditions for the
now-ubiquitous private handpump market.
The national transition towards handpump infrastructure facilitated
institutional shifts starting in the late 1970s as the central state ad-
ministration decentralized service provision responsibility to upazila, or
sub-district county level. The decisions about where to install tubewells
were reallocated from the national agencies to the Union Parishads,
which are the lowest administrative units of local government. By the
late 1980s, the local councils further transferred operational and
maintenance responsibilities to community-based and self-assembled
collectives of users, after tubewells and handpumps had been installed.
This local collective organizing was reinforced by the government’s
Department of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE), which required
that all publicly funded tubewells went to collectives of ten or more
individuals who applied as a group. The applicants had to declare the
water point would be available to anyone from that group. These DPHE
water points were installed after a procurement process that required a
formal tender under a set of defined installation standards, which, as of
2012, required independent water quality testing for each new tubewell
installation (DPHE, 2015b). This provided one form of regulation for
public water points, however they remained unmonitored after in-
stallation.
As the government relinquished control over supply chains, it was
replaced by the growth of the informal private sector local well-drillers,
or mistri, who installed shallow tubewells (STW). These shallow tube-
well depths are defined as less than thirty meters (100 feet) deep. These
are often hand-drilled and are not regulated or licensed by the gov-
ernment. The rapid growth of handpump manufacturers and local in-
formal mechanic markets arguably enabled the informal shift towards
the “self-help” or consumer control model of maintenance (Black,
1990). This private market growth also resulted from an increased
availability of spare parts, overcoming the previous government supply
delays and improving the functionality of infrastructure.
The government and media publicly recognized arsenic con-
tamination in groundwater systems in 1993. This marked the transition
into the second period of drinking water narratives, which continued
until the National Arsenic Mitigation Information Centre (NAMIC),
funded under the Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water Supply Project
(BAMWSP), released the results of the national arsenic blanket-testing,
reducing some of the uncertainties around arsenic distribution and risk.
This phase is characterized by public-sector initiatives to shift house-
hold’s primary drinking water infrastructure towards newly defined
arsenic-safe infrastructure, primarily deep tubewells. The chronic
nature of arsenic pathogenesis and uncertainty of its spatial distribution
was different from the previous acute and immediately visible char-
acteristics of diarrheal diseases, particularly cholera. Risk of arsenic
contamination challenged the previous period’s narrative of rural water
sector progress, which had been facilitated by the wide adoption of
handpumps on shallow tubewells (Caldwell et al., 2003). The risk of
arsenic contamination was also markedly different from other risks, as
Atkins and Dunn (2007) notes, because the knowledge of arsenic con-
tamination is contingent upon experts and scientific testing to render
the problem visible. The resulting techno-political debate around ar-
senic concerns focused on causality, vulnerability, and where to allo-
cate blame for the contamination (Smedley and Kinniburgh, 2002;
Smith et al., 2000; van Geen et al., 2002). The policy response therefore
focused on defining safe infrastructure alternatives to mitigate exposure
(Kabir and Howard, 2007; Sultana, 2013; van Geen, 2008). While ar-
senic-safe technologies dominated national attention, policy solutions
were not directed towards the institutional implications of growing
private markets driving the increasing household reliance on the
shallow tubewell infrastructure.
The 2006 national arsenic mapping resulted in tubewells labelled as
either red or green as a way to warn users of safety. The testing enabled
an inventory to produce more granular hotspot analysis to support
policy responses. This resulted in what van Geen et al. (2016) identify
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as the significant rate of additional investment in public water points,
predominantly deep tubewells, installed in regions with higher rates of
arsenic contamination. While financial resources were provided
through national budgets, specific site selection for new water points
remained the responsibility of local water committees and Pourshavas
(Sultana, 2009). Mobarak and van Geen (2019) suggest that the dis-
tribution of new infrastructure points appeared to favor local elites and
politicians over technocratic processes designed to distribute safe water
point access based on risk to population and demonstrated need. Al-
though poorly tracked, the private market continued to play a role in
filling gaps in public provision.
In contrast to the public water points, private systems did not re-
quire drilling permits, registration, or testing for compliance with na-
tional water safety standards. Policy documents, starting with the 1998
National Policy for Safe Water Supply and Sanitation (Government of
Bangladesh (GoB), 1998) and followed by consecutive government
documents including the National Arsenic Mitigation Plan (GoB,
2004a), did not specify rules for private self-supply infrastructure. The
government’s sector strategies in both 2004 and in 2011 (GoB, 2004b,
2011), focused on how to leverage private finance for larger multi-user
piped networks. Despite the major shift of households away from sur-
face water since the 1970s, only a small fraction of the rural population
had access to formally regulated piped schemes. The majority remained
reliant on tubewells. In 2017, the government estimated a national
average of eighty-eight people per public operating water point (DPHE,
2017a) compared to UNICEF (1993) estimates for 1992 that placed the
average at ninety-two people per public operating water point. Sig-
nificant population growth may explain part of the continued chal-
lenges to service provision. The result is that the literature has arguably
overlooked the conditions leading to increasing market privatization
infrastructure, limitations of public service delivery, and informal al-
location of risk management responsibility to households and in-
dividuals.
Part of this challenge is that tubewell growth rates have not been
consistently or systematically measured over time, specifically when
differentiating public versus privately funded and managed infra-
structure. Estimates of national tubewell infrastructure can be traced
back to 1972 when they were predominantly public water points, as
discussed by Black (1990, p. 44). The 1993 UNICEF and DPHE water
point status report identified the provision and growth of public in-
frastructure only, disregarding private installations (UNICEF, 1993).
The national arsenic mitigation projects produced two of the most
widely cited estimates of public and private tubewell infrastructure.
The first, in the policy findings of the 2000 BGS/DPHE national study,
estimated between six and eleven million tubewells, fifty percent of
which were suggested to be private (BGS, 2001, p. 2). The second was
an outcome of the early 2000s National Arsenic Mitigation Information
Center (NAMIC) project, which tested and labeled nearly five million
public and private water points for arsenic contamination and produced
the national estimate of 8.6 million tubewells (Johnston and Sarker,
2007, p. 1890). Academic studies updated these figures in the early
2010s with estimates of national tubewell infrastructure numbering
between 10 million and 11.5 million for both public and private in-
frastructure (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 2010). These esti-
mates were recently revised by Jamil et al. (2019) with estimates of
eighteen million in 2013. These multiple figures and estimates suggest
that the growth after 2005 is significant, however scale and rate of
growth remains poorly understood outside the public provision system.
This context creates uncertainty around the scale of population relying




This study is designed to triangulate infrastructure growth rates and
investment decisions between two study sites that represent regions of
the country with different risk profiles. The resulting field data is
considered in relation to other public data including an inventory of
public investment costs collected from government project archives.
The empirical contributions of this paper are based on data collected
through water infrastructure audits, or blanket inventories designed to
map every infrastructure point in a defined geographic area and collect
related information from the owners or managers of those points. This
approach provides neighborhood-scale data of infrastructure coverage,
source of investment, and management responsibility for the system. By
mapping every physical water point the study avoids double-counting
water points when co-owned or shared by two or more households, a
problem identified in earlier studies (George et al., 2012b; Hanchett
et al., 2014). The enumeration system identifies bari scale units. A bari
is defined as a group of spatially clustered residential housing struc-
tures, generally linked by related families. These results produce com-
parable estimates on scale, rate, and source of growth from different
regions of Bangladesh.
Several analytical tools are applied to provide interdisciplinary
understanding of the results. To address uncertainty we apply the
Bayesian machine learning Gaussian process (Rasmussen, 2004) to
model the growth trend of tubewells. This statistical approach provides
probabilistic predictions based on uncertain data and is suitable for
incorporating the uncertainty of the reported age and costs. Second, to
understand the density and rate of growth across neighborhoods, mean-
crowding metrics were applied at the village and bari scale across three
periods. This method, borrowed from ecologists, was originally devised
by Lloyd (1967) to reveal the patchiness of micro-scale distribution and
competition experienced by an individual within a defined population.
Mean crowding metrics measure the density from the perspective of the
individual entity in a replicable and defined area. This is applied to the
Matlab tubewell inventory to capture the density per area (bari scale).
Mean crowding values around or below one imply randomly dispersed
tubewells with fewer than one tubewell per bari while higher values
imply densely clustered units, i.e. crowding within the baris. This metric
provides a quantitative way to understand average density de-
pendencies of users-to-infrastructure at large spatial scales, which often
disguise non-random spatial distributions and obscure inequities in
access, patterns of investment, and risk exposure (Wade et al., 2018).
2.2. Study sites and methods
The two water audit studies were undertaken consecutively, starting
at Matlab, Chandpur district, from February until April 2017, followed
by the second research site in Polder 29 of Khulna Division from
December 2017 until January 2018. The field data collection studies
were granted research ethics permissions from the lead university’s
Central Research Ethics Committee. In addition, the work in Matlab
received additional permission from the Research Review Committee
(RRC) and the Ethical Review committee (ERC) at International Centre
for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b) which includes
external reviewers.
2.3. Matlab study site
The Matlab work was designed, managed, and supervised by the
authors and coordinated by a trained project officer and a field manager
based in Matlab. The study population is dispersed across 142 enu-
merator areas, roughly aligned to the lowest level of administrative unit
of the ward. Within these wards, or villages, are the baris. Alam et al.
(2017) and the annual reports of icddr,b (Haq et al., 2018) provide
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further information on the study site. Within the overall 142 villages,
this study purposefully selected ten villages for the infrastructure water
audit, due to budget and time limitations. Infrastructure in the area
included tubewells with different models of No. 6 handpump; no other
handpump types were found in this area of Bangladesh. The selected
villages represent a population of 25,617 people in 6036 households,
according to the 2016 icddr,b demographic data (Haq et al., 2018). The
ten villages were selected based on two criteria: 1) half of the villages
were to be located inside the flood protection embankment, and 2)
include a heterogenous sample of primary drinking water infrastructure
based on the icddr,b 2014 household survey (Haider et al., 2016).
The data were collected by ten female enumerators who were hired
directly from each of the ten villages and trained over the course of a
ten-day period, including piloting data collection and reviewing relia-
bility. Mobile network-enabled tablet computers were programmed
with ONA software (https://ona.io/) to enable enumerators to locate
and map all water point infrastructure in the selected villages and to
complete a questionnaire through an integrated survey tool, with data
immediately displayed on an online platform. Enumerators went to
every icddr,b-defined bari in the villages to visually identify tubewells
and asked residents to locate all domestic water points that are in use,
nonfunctional, or previously abandoned, including ones located inside
the walls of a built structure. Water points solely used for irrigation
were not included in the study. The enumerators identified water points
and interviewed their owners or managers. The data was cleaned each
day, using automated logic checks and manual review to ensure relia-
bility of entry. All respondents were over eighteen years of age and
provided oral consent to be interviewed about their tubewell infra-
structure.
The Matlab water audit questionnaire comprised six thematic sec-
tions after obtaining consent, including: (1) basic identifiers and phy-
sical observations; (2) previous and current use; (3) management re-
sponsibilities; (4) water quality monitoring and safety perceptions; (5)
investment and affordability; (6) functionality, reliability, and main-
tenance. The questionnaire was designed to build on previously stan-
dardized instruments and was refined through key informant interviews
and field-testing prior to implementation.
2.4. Khulna study site
The second field study was conducted by a separate field team under
the same research grant using the same blanket sampling strategy and a
shortened version of the Matlab water infrastructure audit ques-
tionnaire. The site is located 160 km south-west of Matlab in an em-
bankment, or polder system, covering five unions across Dumuria and
Batiaghata upazilas (sub-districts), with 58,000 inhabitants living in
17,000 households. The Khulna water audit was conducted in the south
and central regions of the polder, covering 34,639 residents. The survey
identified 2805 tubewells and nineteen pond sand filters. The data
provides insights, distinct from those of Matlab, through a different
hydro-climatic context in a coastal zone, and decision-responses to high
levels of saline intrusion. Further details can be found in the article by
Hoque et al. (2019).
2.5. Secondary data
This paper draws from the results of several other studies and an
inventory of DPHE project documents. A third geographic region was
identified in order to triangulate findings with the two water infra-
structure audits. This third site is represented in published research
emerging from nearly two decades of longitudinal data collection in the
Health Effects of Arsenic Longitudinal Study (HEALS)in Araihazar. The
Araihazar study area is located 51 km north of Matlab and provides two
blanket surveys of tubewell infrastructure, completed in 2000–2001
and 2012–2013. For full study details see van Geen et al. (2003, 2014)
and recent analysis by Jamil et al. (2019).
The public infrastructure installation cost data was extracted from
sixty-seven different DPHE project proforma documents covering gov-
ernment of Bangladesh investments from 1980 to 2016. This inventory
identified 150 unique budget items recorded as both initial tender costs
and actual reported costs at time of installation. This represents every
project proforma document identified by researchers in the DPHE ar-
chives and is the most comprehensive standardized historic record of
unit costs available. These DPHE project proforma proposals had in-
dicative project budgets that specified prices under categories of deep
versus shallow tubewells, not the specific drilling cost per feet of depth,
which is more often indicative of actual cost. Of the 150 identified cost
figures in these documents, twenty-nine entries were standardized for
shallow tubewell comparisons and thirty-six for deep tubewells. This
analysis uses the initial tender quote aligned to the year provided. The
results of yearly costs were averaged when multiple project costs were
identified in the same year. As of 2017, DPHE (2017b) provided a
standardized list of public sector installation costs by infrastructure
type, however this did not exist for previous years.
3. Results
3.1. Differing interpretations of Matlab’s drinking water infrastructure
growth and transitions
The Matlab household socioeconomic household survey data pro-
vided by iccdr,b across five survey years indicates that by 1980, tube-
wells had overtaken surface water as the reported main drinking water
source in the Matlab villages. The proportion of households relying on
tubewells (both shallow and deep) peaked sixteen years later at ninety-
five percent and was mirrored by the fall of surface water sources to less
than ten percent, as seen in Fig. 2(A). After 1996, no other improved
water infrastructure gained significant use. Piped water schemes in-
stalled in the market areas in the past decade are anticipated to increase
as a primary source in future surveys, however unreliability was re-
ported as a major deterrent of use (Haider et al., 2016; Nahar, 2007;
Razzaque et al., 1996).
The 2017 Matlab water audit reveals a different trajectory of in-
frastructure growth. The water audit identified a total of 3830 water
points in the ten villages, of which 3734 were identified as domestic
water sources and used for the analysis. Abandoned tubewells, defined
as points that owners have no plans to rehabilitate, were identified as
eight percent of the tubewells (n = 295), while non-functional tube-
wells at time of visit were 1.5 percent of the total (n = 58). In order to
account for the respondent’s recall bias observed in the spike of re-
ported tubewell installations each five years from date of interview, a
Gaussian process (Rasmussen, 2004) was used to model the uncertainty
in the data, represented in Fig. 2 (B) as upper and lower bounds of the
ninety-five percent confidence interval. While the proportion of
households using tubewells as their main source of drinking water de-
clined temporarily during the height of the arsenic crisis in the early
2000s, the rate of installations continued to grow exponentially. As seen
in Fig. 2(B), the majority (sixty percent) of tubewell growth (n = 2234)
occurred after icddr,b’s blanket arsenic-testing campaign completed in
2005, which labeled tubewells red or green in accordance with the
government of Bangladesh’s arsenic safety threshold of 50 ppb
(Jakariya et al., 2007). Further, out of the tubewells installed post-
2005, eighty percent were reported as used for drinking water. The
results show that the increase in number of new tubewells did not slow
after the arsenic contamination was discovered, or after the first blanket
testing of every tubewell in Matlab was completed. The growth suggests
households’ preference for individual and private sources located on
premises.
The coverage rate of primary source does not reflect the wider in-
frastructure context. The rate of change shows that the reliance on tu-
bewells plateaued in the late 1990s, however new installations con-
tinued to increase exponentially, as shown in Fig. 3. Applying density of
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households to tubewell or users to tubewell ratios provides an im-
portant perspective on changing infrastructure conditions. The ratio
revealed that the average coverage rates increased from over fifty-seven
households per tubewell in 1982 to less than two households per tu-
bewell in 2017.
The trajectory of the total number of tubewells in the ten villages is
approaching the same number of households who report tubewells as
their main infrastructure. If the 2015–2016 growth rate of nine percent
and number of households are held constant, it suggests that within the
next decade Matlab villages could reach a point of market saturation of
one tubewell per household. This is reinforced by the water audit
findings that sixty-seven percent of shallow tubewells were reported as
being used by a single household compared to twenty percent of deep
tubewells. When considering use as comprising three or fewer house-
holds, this number increased to ninety percent of the shallow tubewells
and thirty percent of the deep tubewells. This indicates the market has
shifted towards private and largely self-supply water points.
This ratio also reveals further village-level characteristics. By 2017
the differences in infrastructure coverage between villages, seen in
Fig. 4, had diminished significantly. This study revealed a decrease in
standard deviation of 1.63 in 2005 to 0.38 in 2017. This metric is
significant when considering the total population in the study area has
grown ten percent since 1996. Notably, the number of households has
grown seventy percent in that same period, reflecting even greater
demand for new water points from households with smaller average
family sizes. Further, the two villages with historically lower coverage
reported the largest increases. These two village are assessed by
iccdr,b’s asset index as experiencing the lowest wealth levels of the ten
villages surveyed (Haider et al., 2016). The two villages with the lowest
asset scores showed the greatest relative increase of new tubewells.
Within the newly installed tubewells, less than 1.5 percent were iden-
tified as publicly funded, indicating demand and willingness to pay
among private households. The villages in this small sample are not
representative, however the results indicate potential for future
Fig. 2. Main source and growth rates A) Households main source of drinking water from 1974 to 2014 across 142 villages of icddr,b enumeration area. B) Number of
tubewell installed each year as reported by owners in 2017 water audit for ten villages. N = 3734.
Fig. 3. Comparison of tubewell growth from icddr,b household surveys and water infrastructure audit results, 1982-2016.
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research.
The village ratios are one new perspective, however they still ob-
scure the bari-scale growth patterns. The spatiotemporal changes in
dependencies on water points remain poorly understood. By applying
the mean crowding metric to one village), illustrated through a map of
tubewell locations and year of installation in Fig. 5, it provides an
empirical analysis of this transition from public multi-user water points
to private self-supply systems. The village has 227 tubewells for 480
households and a population of 2026 people as of the 2017 survey.
Before 1996, seven percent of the baris had a tubewell, reflecting a
mean crowding of less than one. Despite the very small portion of baris
having tubewell infrastructure, the prominence of tubewells as the
primary drinking water source of households increased from twenty
percent in 1982 to fifty-six percent in 1996 (Razzaque et al., 1996). By
2005, seventy percent of the households reported using tubewells as
their main drinking water source (Nahar, 2007) but only thirty-three
percent of the baris had tubewell infrastructure. The 2005 mean
crowding remained less than one. By 2017, eighty-two percent of the
baris reporting having at least one tubewell and the mean crowding rose
to four. While density increased, the village reported only a small
Fig. 4. Village-level comparison of household to tubewell ratio, 2005 to 2017.
Fig. 5. Spatial distribution of tubewell growth by year of installation in one village, group by icddr,b survey years.
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increase (+four percent) in numbers using tubewells as their primary
drinking water source. This reflects the increased density or crowding
of tubewells in each bari, a shift in demand for household-level water
points.
This progression shows the transition in household preferences for
on– or in-premises water point infrastructure. Households’ main
drinking water infrastructure between the 1970s and 1990s reflects a
period of pooled risk through shared water points under collective or
public management models (Ahmed, 1998). By 2005, the reliance on
multi-user shared tubewells located in nearby baris diminished and
switched to a system of tubewells privately managed by a collective of
multiple users, often located within individual baris as indicated by
higher crowding metrics. Most recently, ownership has shifted to in-
dividual water points per household, diminishing reliance on shared
tubewells within the same bari. The rates of this change vary between
villages, but all show similar trajectories towards self-supply of between
one and two households per tubewell, driven by private finance.
Beyond the aggregate growth rate and spatial patterns there are two
additional trends which are not widely quantified or identified by
previous studies but consistent across both Matlab and Khulna sites.
The first is the specific role of private financing in this growth trajectory
and the second is changing technology preferences increasingly shifted
towards private deep tubewells, electric pumps, and in-premises
handpump access.
The increased installation of individual and private water points is
linked to changing ownership and management structures. In Matlab,
ninety-five percent of the shallow and seventy-two percent of deep
tubewells were reported as privately owned, financed, and managed.
This allocates decision-making responsibility for water safety and the
financial burden of repairs onto private households.
The second observation is a shift of private investment towards deep
tubewells and electric pumps. The Matlab water audit identified that
five percent of the tubewells (n = 173) were reported to be deeper than
150 m; of these ninety percent were installed after 2005 and two-thirds
privately financed. Further, one in ten tubewells reported using electric
pump systems (n = 343) instead of No. 6 handpumps. There was a
further shift in household preferences: nearly sixty percent of identified
No. 6 handpumps installed between 2006 and 2017 were located inside
a built structure, defined as located within an enclosure of four walls.
These observed trends suggest the market is in the early stages of
changing preferences and redefining demand both for deep tubewells,
defined as safer, and for the convenience of service delivery, directly
into households.
3.2. Comparing regional growth trends
Previous blanket inventories provide an opportunity for insight into
the regional comparability of the tubewell market’s growth and varia-
tion of risk responses across different environmental and socioeconomic
contexts. While recognizing that the majority of the population has
obtained access to improved infrastructure, previous studies identified
significant variation in tubewell density between southern coastal areas
and other regions of the country (UNICEF, 1993). As seen in Fig. 6, the
gaps between these regions have diminished significantly in the past
seventeen years. The recent ratios range from 12.4 people per tubewell
in Khulna in 2017; 6.7 in Matlab in 2017; 7.8 in Araihazar in 2013 as
reported in Jamil et al. (2019) and 9.2 nationally using government
estimates of rural population per tubewell ratios (BBS, 2015).
4. Contrasting risk drivers
The largest scale of growth was observed in the coastal belt. In this
region, the presence of salinity in the upper shallow aquifer, which
extends to a depth of 100 m, has high spatial variability similar to ar-
senic contamination (Hoque et al., 2019). Data from groundwater
monitoring wells installed by Bangladesh Water Development Board
(BWDB) show that electrical conductivity in the shallow and main
aquifers typically exceeds 8,000 µS/cm and 6,000 µS/cm during the dry
pre-monsoon season (Zahid et al., 2013). In Bangladesh, the official
permissible threshold level of salt in groundwater for the coastal dis-
tricts is set at 1000 ppm or 1500 µS/cm, which is higher than the
standard set at 600 ppm for the rest of the country (GoB, 2011).
In this coastal region, there is greater diversity of infrastructure
options than in Matlab. In the areas adjacent to the Polder 29, house-
holds have a greater reliance on alternative sources such as pond sand
filters, small piped schemes, rainwater and informal vendors for
drinking water (Hoque and Hope, 2019). Yet, in the past decade, the
number of tubewells in the Khulna study site quadrupled, with seventy-
eight percent of the 2443 functional tubewells in 2018 being privately
funded and thirty-seven percent being used for drinking, though one-
third of the latter exceeded the salinity threshold of 1500 µS/cm, as
shown in Fig. 7. In contrast, the tubewell numbers doubled in Matlab
during the same period, with over seventy percent reportedly being
used for drinking purposes. This reflects a critical difference in the type
of groundwater concerns and risk responses, as unlike arsenic, salinity
can be detected by taste. The rate of growth of privately financed tu-
bewells remains similar to Matlab.
5. National growth beyond public provision models
This section estimates the national tubewell infrastructure stock
using the 2017 population per tubewell ratios from Matlab and Polder
29 to determine the high and low bounds of estimated rural tubewell
coverage. The selection of Matlab as the upper boundary and Khulna as
the lower boundary corresponds to previous UNICEF and DPHE studies
that identify these areas of the country as having the highest and the
lowest infrastructure density (DPHE, 2016; UNICEF, 1993). Future
studies would ideally refine these estimates with additional blanket
inventories from around the country. The World Bank population data
is linked to density of infrastructure to provide an estimated total tu-
bewells in the rural areas for 2017 of between 8.8 million and 15.8
million tubewells. These are consistent with Jamil et al. (2019) esti-
mates.
Projecting total national tubewell growth was difficult due to the
absence of data on public and private tubewells in urban areas, an issue
identified across multiple other studies. The urban level of households
reporting use of tubewells as their main drinking water source in census
data dropped from sixty-four percent in 2001 to forty-five percent in
2011 (BBS, 2012). However, this drop is not directly associated with the
infrastructure investment in tubewells in use or dependency ratios, as
many urban residents access multiple sources or report access to piped
water while using privately funded handpumps to lift that water from
underground reserve tanks. The World Bank reports that seventy per-
cent of urban households in Bangladesh use tubewells as a water source
(World Bank, 2018b). The 2011 Water Supply and Sanitation Sector
Development Plan (WSSSDP) (GoB, 2011) only discusses urban areas
covered by WASA areas, two city corporations, and 102 Pourshavas
(small town municipalities) out of the total 308 Pourshavas (GoB, 2011,
p. 18). The report provides a count of 172,077 tubewells (GoB, 2011,
pp. 26–29). The report does not specify if this includes private tube-
wells. This estimate represents roughly half the total projected urban
population, with an estimated 22.79 million people living in the re-
maining 206 Pourshavas as of 2011, areas where tubewell ownership
and dependency is assumed to be higher. In order to determine a proxy
estimate for the urban tubewell infrastructure stock, we use the 1998
National Policy for Safe Water Supply and Sanitation (NPSWSS) docu-
ment (GoB, 1998), which sets the target ratio used to estimate the urban
area tubewell infrastructure in relation to total population: fifty people
per public water point and five people per private water point. To es-
timate total urban tubewells, the national public-to-private ratio from
2010 is applied to the World Bank’s estimated urban population with
the target number of people per tubewell. We recognize there are
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multiple limitations to this approach that can be modified in future
studies.
These projections result with a total estimate of 2,666,446 tubewells
in urban areas, although this is likely underestimated. When combined
with the rural numbers, the projected national number of tubewells is
between 11.5 million and 18.4 million tubewells, as shown in Fig. 8.
Within the total infrastructure, the ratio of public-to-private has
changed significantly since 1972. Starting in 2012, the annual DPHE
Circle Wise Water Source Status and Coverage Reports openly released
data on publicly funded rural water infrastructure showing a steady,
but lower, growth rate compared to private water points and the dis-
trict-level spatial distribution of coverage (DPHE, 2017a). The
government estimates a national coverage rate of eighty-eight people
per public water point in 2017 (DPHE, 2017a). This represents a total of
1,662,672 publicly-funded water points, of which ninety-one percent
were reported as functional. These include 962,933 shallow tubewells,
335,538 deep tubewells, 292,936 Tara tubewells, 14,593 shallow
shrouded tubewells, and the remaining split between pond sand filters,
ringwells, rain water harvesting systems (DPHE, 2017a). Publicly pro-
vided water points are therefore estimated between eight percent and
fifteen percent of the total non-piped infrastructure.
Fig. 6. Regional tubewell growth estimates through population-to-tubewell density across three blanket surveys and the national average. 2000–2017.
Fig. 7. Cumulative growth of tubewells as reported by age across two study sites and proportion of tubewells installed each individual year for drinking water
purposes.
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5.1. Infrastructure investment cost analysis
The owners and managers of drinking-water-only water points in-
stalled between 2006 and 2017 in Matlab were asked to identify the
motivation for their private investments. Recognizing that the re-
sponses may be influenced by strategic recall bias, we find a clear
majority installed new water points based on a preference for a private
water supply (ninety-four percent). Investment driven by concerns for
quality were far less frequent: well-switching away from an arsenic-
contaminated source (ten percent) was less than well-switching for non-
arsenic water-contamination concerns (twenty-four percent). A simi-
larly low proportion of respondents identified financial motivations for
investing, with twelve percent of households identifying an increase in
income as motivation. More importantly, none of the households re-
ported cost reduction of hardware as a motivation.
Using data from the Matlab water audit results and extracted from
DPHE project proforma documents archives, Fig. 9 constructs a time
series of reported public and private costs for installing shallow tube-
wells since the 1980s. These are adjusted for inflation to real 2017
prices using World Bank deflators and the World Bank Official exchange
rate.
The results suggest households may not have directly identified a
cost reduction but may have experienced a significant one when con-
sidering inflation and relative costs of other goods. The compiled his-
torical price records suggest a seventy percent decrease in real price for
private shallow tubewells installed between 1982 and 2017. In contrast,
the figures suggest a forty-three percent fall in the real price of publicly
provided shallow tubewells. While the inflation-adjusted real costs for
both private and public installation costs have significantly and steadily
decreased since the 1980s, the nominal prices have more than doubled.
The nominal prices for publicly or privately installed shallow tubewells
in the early 1980s were roughly equivalent, both around BDT 4500
(USD 184). By 2017, the costs for private installations had increased to
BDT 10,123 (USD 121) while the costs for publicly installed systems
increased to BDT 22,145 (USD 275). When these nominal prices are
adjusted to real prices, there is a decrease from USD 444 in 1980 to USD
125 in 2017.
A similar pattern was observed for publicly funded deep tubewells,
whereby nominal costs for private installers rose 168 percent from BDT
42,806 (USD 1383) in 1987 to over BDT 115,000 (USD 1454) in 2017.
When adjusted to 2017 real inflation-adjusted costs however, the re-
verse occurred, with a drop from BDT 237,887 (USD 2,957) to
BDT115,000 (USD 1,429). Although the nominal costs increased, the
way consumers would perceive costs relative to other goods would feel
less expensive in 2017 compared to earlier periods.
Beyond capital expenditure (CapEx) for installation, No.6 hand-
pumps have annual operation and maintenance costs (OpEx) to factor
into annual sector financial flows. The annual OpEx in Matlab show
that costs vary by infrastructure age, with older handpumps reported as
having higher average annual costs. The annual reported OpEx for both
public and private shallow tubewells with handpumps installed in
Matlab before 2007 averaged BDT 536 (USD 7.50) per year per hand-
pump (n = 793). For those installed after 2007, there was a reported
average yearly expenditure BDT 319 (USD 4.47) per year per hand-
pump (n = 1,167). These reported expenditures identify households’
willingness for recurring investment.
6. Private household investment as a major contributor to
national sector finance
When considering both capital and operational expenses, there is a
significant inflow of financial investment from the private sector not
clearly accounted for in public planning models. Assuming a continued
nine percent growth rate of tubewell infrastructure for rural areas based
on the Matlab data, finding the projected national growth suggests a
potential of between 793,005 to 1,420,307 new water points would
have been installed in 2018, a year after this study. If most of the
growth remained shallow tubewells, and the average private market
costs remained around BDT 10,000 (USD 120), there is a potential of
between USD 94.6 million (BDT 7.9 billion) to USD 170.1 million (BDT
14.2 billion) worth of new CapEx investments in 2018. Based on the
infrastructure inventory count and age estimates, we estimate that the
Fig. 8. Estimates of national tubewell growth from 1972 until 2016 and distribution of public versus private investment.
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annual OpEx investment from rural households is upwards of BDT 6.9
billion or USD 83 million for 2018. The estimated total of both CapEx
and OpEx investment for tubewells in 2018 is between USD 177.6
million and USD 253 million.
7. Discussion
Communities in rural Bangladesh have transitioned into a pre-
dominately self-supply and informal service delivery model. Privately
financed and unregulated household infrastructure systems are being
installed at rates and scales multiple times greater than formally
regulated public systems. While this private investment has contributed
to national success in achieving the Millennium Development Goals
(MDG) of improved infrastructure access, it has not been accompanied
by effective regulatory mechanisms or information systems to manage
the risks related to untested water quality and unmonitored water
supply. The estimated growth of tubewells at the three sites observed
between 1970 and 2017 suggest that the total rural infrastructure stock
is undercounted in national policy planning processes, thus potentially
under-estimating population-level exposure to poor water quality.
Neglecting to systematically quantify so great a development may ap-
pear remarkable, however it is not without precedent. In East Africa,
the doubling rural per-capita use of hand-carried water, probably due to
the shift from groundnut oil tins to plastic jerry-cans for carrying the
water, was similarly missed until it was measured in a multi-country
study (Thompson et al., 2001). These results further imply that the
major shift in demand and service preferences could transform the rural
water sector strategy by leveraging public–private investments in ways
which enable pooled-risk through regulated service models.
The findings indicate that for every new publicly funded rural water
point installed by the government between 2012 and 2017, an esti-
mated forty-five new tubewells were privately installed. While the scale
tubewell infrastructure has been roughly estimated in previous site-
specific studies, including by Jamil et al. (2019), the national im-
plications of the continued growth rate and privatized management has
not been fully debated. The design of rural institutions, specifically how
risk-management responsibilities have been allocated, have not
adapted in response to this infrastructure growth.
The drinking-water sector strategies have not recognized or been
designed to manage the rapid shift of rural consumer preferences to-
wards on- and in-premises private water infrastructure (GoB, 2011).
This study suggests that the continued growth in number of built
household structures for smaller family sizes is increasing the total in-
frastructure demand points. The focus on lower population growth rate
in rural areas compared to urban areas distracts from the forty-three
percent increase of households between the 2001 and 2011 censuses
(BBS, 2012). This study shows that as the tubewells per household ratio
is approaching a one-to-one ratio, it implies demand for tubewells could
be approaching a point of market saturation.
Beyond increasing demand points, the preferences for in-premises
services are also changing. The study identifies the important and un-
expected increase of private household investment in deep tubewells.
Policy strategies have long assumed that the costs of deep tubewells
were unaffordable to households(GoB, 2004a). This study indicates
rural families are in an early-stage shift of willingness to invest in
deeper wells normally provided by government procurement and fi-
nancing. Further, the increased consumer demand for on-premises ac-
cess, delivered through mechanized pumping of groundwater, amplifies
medium-term risk of increased extraction at a time that recharge rates
and surface supply variability is increasing (DPHE, 2015a).
The findings from Matlab and Khulna field studies demonstrate the
scale of household water supplies that operate outside any formal
regulatory processes or monitoring structures. Since the public debate
began around how to respond to widespread uncertainty about arsenic
contamination of the groundwater system, scholars, including van Geen
et al. (2002) and Pfaff et al. (2017), have documented the lack of testing
at installation for private tubewells. The national blanket testing in the
early 2000s provided a granular and robust inventory of distribution of
arsenic exposure, however the more-than-doubling of untested new
tubewells since 2006 leaves an even greater proportion of the popula-
tion at risk of exposure. Government agencies have formalized regula-
tions and processes for testing all public water points, while noting
Fig. 9. Falling costs of private tubewells compared to public tubewells (adjusted to real prices, 2017) Sources: Matlab Water Audit and DPHE project proforma costs.
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continued questions of enforcement and reliability. However, these
rules have not been extended to the rural private market, including
drillers and private vendors.
This study reinforces previous analyses that suggest households do
not directly invest in information on water quality (Ahmad et al., 2005;
Balasubramanya et al., 2014; Barnwal et al., 2017). The Matlab survey
did not identify any private household-level investment into testing, a
cost which represents between one and three percent of the total
shallow tubewell installation cost (Pfaff et al., 2017). This cost-point
suggests it is not an issue of affordability relative to other investments
but one perhaps of preference or low market availability of testing kits.
This study poses a contrasting question to previous research into
risk-response behavioral dynamics. Previous studies explored house-
holds’ behavioral responses to increasing awareness of arsenic and
motivations for well-switching (Madajewicz et al., 2007). This study
identified that fewer than a quarter of tubewell owners in Matlab re-
called water quality concerns as the motivating reason for installing
their private water point. Instead there is a clear preference to have an
on- or in-premises water source. Despite Matlab being in an area with
decades of NGO activities focused on cholera prevention activities and
blanket arsenic-testing leaving visible red handpump handles as sig-
nifiers of risk, the continued exponential growth of untested tubewells
suggests household preferences for self-supply is driving demand.
Previous studies offer insights into the costs of installing tubewells
in specific years but not how they have changed between decades. Most
of the previous cost analyses are based on a single-year estimate derived
from NGO and government budgets, not from private market vendors
(Balasubramanya et al., 2014; Jakariya et al., 2007; Jamil et al., 2019;
Ravenscroft et al., 2014) By tracking the average costs of shallow tu-
bewells on the private market and adjusting to 2017 real terms, this
study suggests that consumers experienced the costs in 2016–2017 as
nearly three times less expensive than those in the early 1980s. Al-
though lower costs were not identified by consumers as a motivating
factor for investment, perhaps because in nominal terms they have
steadily increased, the installation costs are lower when considered in
relation to other consumer goods. This reinforces early writing by Black
(1990) stating that domestic production in the late 1980s and early
1990s enabled lower cost and larger-scale distribution of handpumps
outside government supply chains.
These consumer preferences have significant policy and financial
implications for a sector traditionally lacking reliable private capital
flows. Previous studies in Bangladesh by Khan et al. (2014) show that
households are, on average, willing to allocate five percent of their
disposable income to safe tubewells and twenty percent to piped water
schemes. This study seeks to expand beyond previous discussions of
household-specific investment towards questions of what potential
there is for sector-scale private capital to be leveraged as part of a
blended finance model with public budgets.
This article estimates that for 2018 the total national rural private
investment into tubewell infrastructure is upwards of USD 253 million
including both capital and OpEx investments. This compares to 2017
GLAAS data on Bangladesh which reported a total WASH sector-wide
expenditure of USD 1.157 billion across urban and rural geographies, of
which USD 385 million was identified as investment by households,
USD$336.8 million from government budgets, and USD 436.1 million
from external aid (WHO, 2019). This implies that nearly two out of
every ten dollars spent in the entire WASH sector is household spending
on new tubewells. This study further suggests that the investment into
tubewells could represent upwards of sixty-five percent of the total
household investment in the WASH sector as estimated in GLAAS re-
ports. These findings suggest that the level of household investment is
increasing, however GLAAS data from 2014 and 2017 suggests that
household investment has declined ten percent (USD 43 million) (WHO,
2019). Without more granular and standardized monitoring of private
financial flows, the scale and potential for blended investment for
overall sector needs remains uncertain.
The findings have advanced an argument that national development
agenda progress, including achieving global MDG targets of improved
infrastructure access, were enabled by the government investment
programs launched in the 1970s and 1980s, but success was driven by
private sector capital investment, specifically from households from all
income and wealth brackets across multiple locations. The rural water-
sector institutions have been designed around the risk logic of provision
of access, a system which is undiscerning of the consequences of private
assumption of responsibility. The role of private investment in
Bangladesh has advanced national provision targets but has concealed
the increased risks of exposure to unsafe water and supply variability.
This has occurred while management responsibilities have been re-
allocated outside direct government regulatory control or pooled risk
mechanisms.
In order to achieve SDG 6.1, institutions are advancing beyond in-
frastructure provision logics to include risk logics focused on mitigation
of uncertainty and managing the distribution of vulnerability and ex-
posure. The rural drinking-water sector in Bangladesh provides insights
into the process. The situation is now one of unregulated infrastructure
with individualized responsibility for risk management. Although sev-
eral policy reports suggest it is not feasible to retrospectively regulate
private self-supply infrastructure (World Bank, 2018b, p. 22), recent
articles by Jamil et al. (2019) argue there are cost-effective ways to
optimize the spatial distribution of safe water points. Comparative
country approaches also focus on licensing and standardization of
drillers and the installation market. The tubewell density shown in the
crowding metrics suggest spatial optimization models would offer fur-
ther methods to facilitate consideration of the costs and benefits of
small-scale distributed infrastructure networks, specifically as electric
pumps are increasingly available to consumers. Further, the informal
network of small vendors could be incentivized through a blended fi-
nance and performance-based service-delivery model. The household’s
preferences for in-premises water points indicates a potential will-
ingness to pay. These new forms of shared risks underpin the redesign
of institutional risk mentalities to more directly address risk manage-
ment. The government could play the role of risk regulator without
compromising the momentum of private finance in the sector by in-
centivizing households to pool finances and be accountable to the re-
duction of uncertainties of service delivery.
8. Conclusion
The SDG 6.1 of safely managed drinking water for all is sub-
stantively different from the MDGs of improved infrastructure access.
Countries like Bangladesh saw their hard-won gains of achieving almost
universal access to improved infrastructure being redefined because of
gaps in safely and reliably managed services. While the success in
achieving the MDG drinking-water goals was largely enabled by
Bangladeshi families’ private investment in new infrastructure, not
government or donor funding, it is unlikely the SDGs will be achieved
through the privatized risk-responsibility enabled by the self-supply
systems.
With annual global financing needs for rural drinking water services
estimated at USD 37.6 billion per year (Hutton and Varughese, 2016)
the SDGs strategies could benefit from cost-sharing arrangements that
harness this private demand in coordination with provision of public
financial investments under forms of collective risk management. The
government of Bangladesh has an opportunity to demonstrate this po-
tential by harnessing the demand for improved services and infra-
structure and leveraging the significant private investments by rural
water-users. Early evidence from comparative rural public–private
models is qualified by limited performance without accompanying in-
stitutional, regulatory, and financial architecture (Koehler et al., 2015).
The challenge identified for Bangladesh in this article is to shift portions
of the informal market towards regulated governance systems before
the next phase of explosive growth of technology that could enable
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greater extraction of either untested water quality or water from deep
aquifers.
The exponential growth of self-supply tubewells in Bangladesh is a
clear example of the need to transition the institutional design from an
MDG focus on provision to an SDG design focused on managing for
multiple intersecting risks. Since 1972 the Bangladeshi rural drinking
water sector has shifted responsibility from being formally allocated to
central government departments under a post-independence social
contract that guaranteed infrastructure access, to the reverse, where
individual families informally assume responsibility for managing their
own infrastructure and services. This reallocation means that the re-
sponsibility for managing water quality and reliability remains un-
recognized in formal rules of national law and policy. There is no
current explicit regulation of private sector vendors or self-supply ser-
vices.
The results of this study estimate that, after the completion of the
national blanket arsenic testing in 2006, an estimated nine million tu-
bewells were privately installed, the vast majority of which have not
been tested for compliance with national water quality standards. With
the rural tubewell market approaching a saturation point for house-
holds’ demand, the high levels of private investment are not certain to
continue.
The infrastructure audits indicate that consumer preference will
shift towards higher-quality and more convenient services. Regulating
risks of shallow tubewells is a major challenge but the shift towards
electric pumps and in-premise piped systems offers an opportunity to
align user demand and payments with regulated services. Shifting this
risk-management approach would require the government and major
stakeholders to rethink current and planned investments in ways that
adopt a risk logic focused on managing the uncertainty of water quality
and supply reliability. Risk theory provides a critical framework for
interrogation of the institutional design of responsibility, decision
processes, and the formal and informal rules.
The challenge remains that comparative global and national gov-
ernance paradigms offer limited insights into how to regulate private
actions in rural drinking water contexts, a sphere previously defined as
outside the allocated authority of public action and government man-
dates. It is far more politically palatable to provide new infrastructure
over regulating the use of existing infrastructures. The continued and
growing concern for rural drinking water safety and reliability connects
back to the limitations of modern institutions in managing risks when
responsibility is allocated to individuals, not collectives. Without
quantifying and debating institutional designs of shared responsibility
through regulatory and monitoring approaches, the drinking water
sector in the SDG era remains at risk of underperforming.
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